Abstract. This paper explores the mereology of structural universals, using the structural richness of a non-classical mereology without unique fusions. The paper focuses on a problem posed by David Lewis, who using the example of methane, and assuming classical mereology, argues against any purely mereological theory of structural universals. The problem is that being a methane molecule would have to contain being a hydrogen atom four times over, but mereology does not have the concept of the same part occurring several times. This paper takes up the challenge by providing mereological analysis of three operations sufficient for a theory of structural universals: (1) Reflexive binding, i.e. identifying two of the places of a universal; (2) Existential binding, i.e. the language-independent correlate of an existential quantification; and (3) Conjunction.
Introduction
This paper explores the mereology of structural universals, and in doing so it also explores some of the structural richness of mereology, provided we do not assume the uniqueness of fusion. The paper focuses on a problem posed by David Lewis in [9] . Using the example of methane, he argued against any purely mereological theory of structural universals. For on a mereological theory, the universal being a methane (CH4) molecule should be the sum of its parts, namely the universals being a carbon atom, being a hydrogen atom, and being bonded. As Lewis points out, being a methane molecule would have to contain being a hydrogen atom four times over, but mereology does not have the concept of the same part occurring several times. Hence, he argues, there cannot be a purely mereological account of structural universals, which he takes to be a serious objection to realism about universals. This problem may be reformulated as the challenge to distinguish the universal being a methane molecule from the universal being a methylene (CH2) molecule, and to make this distinction using mereology alone. An obvious thought is that being a methane molecule has a part, being the sum of 4 hydrogen atoms that being a methylene molecule lacks. But this just shifts the challenge to providing a mereological distinction between being the sum of 4 hydrogen atoms and being the sum of 2 hydrogen atoms. This paper takes up the challenge by rejecting the classical mereology that Lewis assumed. To do so, I provide mereological analyses of three operations sufficient for a theory of structural universals.
Reflexive binding: identifying two of the places of a universal to
obtain another universal. In the dyadic case this is forming Rxx out of Rxy. (E.g. x's loving self is the reflexive binding of x loving y.) I stipulate the no universal is a reflexive binding of itself. Thus if Rxx = Rxy then we do not call Rxx a reflexive binding of Rxy.
(Suppose it was a deep metaphysical truth that necessarily if you truly love yourself you love everyone. Then x's loving self and x's loving y turn out to be the same universal, x loves.) 2. Existential binding: the language-independent correlate of an existential quantification that binds one free variable, so as to form another universal (E.g. Both x's loving someone and someone's loving x are existential bindings of x loving y.) I stipulate that no universal is an existential binding of itself. An n-adic universal can have up to n successive existential binding. The result of the n of them is the total existential binding. 3 . Conjunction.
I am considering a sparse theory of universals, inspired by [1] 1 . Therefore three further operations, disjunction, negation and subtrac-tion do not apply automatically. It is nonetheless interesting to decide when, if at all, they can be given a mereological analysis.
I hypothesise that if we start with some universals without structure then using the three operations repeatedly we can derive all the structural universals. 2 The way our predicates apply is, in non-fictional cases, determined by the universals and their instances. There are more and less complicated ways linking a univocal predicate to one or more universals. The most straightforward is the way the predicate Ux applies to the instances of the corresponding property U x. Greater complexity is illustrated by disjunctions. If U x and V y have no disjunction, the disjunctive predicate 'Ux and/or Vx' applies both to instances of U x and of V y. But where there is a disjunctive universal the disjunctive predicate also applies directly to instances of the disjunctive universal.
The core of this paper consists of a section in which the mereology of structural universals is explored and a section in which I show how the various structure-forming operations can be characterised mereologically. Of the three sections preceding the core, the first will deal with some preliminaries such as notation. Then I expound the non-classical mereology that I employ. This theory is a refinement of classical mereology, in the sense that there is an equivalence relation (overlapping the very same items) and the equivalence classes satisfy the axioms of classical mereology. Next I provide (nominal) definitions of the operations. After the mereological analyses of these operations, I reply to some objections. This paper is part of a larger project of Ontology Within the Bounds of Mereology, something I have provided a preliminary sketch elsewhere (see [7] ). 3 In this paper I shall assume that universals are somehow distinguished from particulars, and I shall not rely on the mereological characterisation of instantiation in. Likewise, I shall ignore second and higher order universals until I reply to the final objection. So the 2 In this paper I shall stick to the finite case, so the problem of infinite complexity does not arise.
3 I there distinguished a relation from its converse, which I now think is an unwarranted projection onto universals of the distinction among predicates. More important, I attempted a mereological characterization of the exemplification of a universal by one or more particulars. This was too complicated. I now consider it best to concentrate on instantiation in, which I distinguish from exemplification by in Section One below. The complexities are thus shifted to semantics, which as a human construct should not be expected to be simple.
part/whole and other mereological operations are restricted to first order universals.
1. Preliminaries 1.1. Stipulation concerning the terms 'property' and 'relation' By a property I mean a monadic universal, by a relation a universal of adicity greater than one. I shall also be considering 0-adic universals. These are neither properties nor relations.
A sparse platonist theory of universals

4
Following Armstrong I analyse similarity in a respect as the sharing of a universal. Similarity in a respect is something we have quite strong intuitions about, extrapolating from perceived resemblance. Intuitively, being of a precise hue of colour such as scarlet is a respect of similarity, and so intuitively we expect there to be a universal x's being scarlet. As this example indicates, such intuitions are not infallible. For there is a lively debate between realists and anti-realists about colour, conducted independently of debates about universals So a realist about universals who is an anti-realist about colours will treat x's being scarlet as a fictional universal.
Intuitions about similarity are not the only data for a sparse theory. The statements of laws of nature and the truths about causation distinguish various predicates that should correspond to universals. In addition, a theory of structural universals should provide enough (first and higher-order universals) to form the topic of mathematics (see [8] ).
On a sparse theory we have a list of basic first-order universals, ones lacking structure. There is a range of operations on them that does not imply that every property has a negation, and does not imply that any two properties have a disjunction. Nor are these restrictions merely consequences of the requirement that no property belongs to everything possible and no property belongs to nothing possible. In this context, the mark of the sparse conception is the reluctance to admit disjunctive or negative properties, rather than the positing of some minimal list of basic universals. I shall, therefore, help myself to illustrative examples, such as the relation of x's loving y, which might not meet the strict standards of a sparse theory.
There are two respects in which my proposed theory is sparser than Armstrong's. The first is that there are no impure relational properties, such as x's being within a billion kilometres from the Sun. There are, however pure relational properties, such as x ′ s being within a billion kilometres from a star. The second respect in which I am sparser than Armstrong is that I do not treat as distinct a dyadic relation (e.g. x loving y) and its converse (x being loved by y). 5 And generalizing, I do not accept a multiplicity of n-adic universals obtained by permuting the places. As a consequence we do not need the operation of permuting places.
I require every universal to be possibly instantiated. In addition, to avoid trivial universals I require every universal to have a possible non-instance. 6 For example, the putative relation of x's being identical to y collapses into the property of x's being identical to x, which I reject as trivial.
Some notation
To avoid cumbersome notation I rely heavily on two conventions. The first is that universals are referred to using italics, but predicates are not. The second is that the same letters will be used for predicates and the corresponding universals, where there are any. Consequently referring expressions for a universal have free variables, as would the corresponding predicate. In this way there is no confusion with other uses of italics.
Thus the metathety (between-ness) universal would be referred to not as being between but as y being between x and z. If considering a monadic universal I write U x or U y, V x or V y etc. For a dyadic universal, I write U xy or U yz, V xy or V yz etc. When considering universals of arbitrary adicity, I write U xy . . ., V xy . . ., etc.
Correspondence
On a sparse theory only some predicates correspond to universals. On the other hand, for any universal U xy . . Because I shall not be distinguishing a relation from its converses, correspondence is ambiguous up to the order of the n-tuples in the predicate. Thus the same relation corresponds to 'x loves y' and 'y loves x', but not, alas, to the symmetric 'x and y love each other'. More alarming, if, for instance, Px corresponds to a universal P x then the predicates, Px & Py, Px & Py & Pz etc. all correspond to the same universal P x. So by the adicity of a universal I mean the minimum number of variables in a corresponding predicate. 
Instantiation in
For the remainder of the paper, I shall ignore exemplification and concentrate on instantiation in.
More notation
The symbols '&', '∃', '∨' and '¬' are reserved for operations on predicates. Hence the nominal definition of the (narrow) conjunction of two monadic universals U x and V y is U z & V z, which is equivalent to:
The conjunction of two monadic universals U x and V y is the universal corresponding to the predicate 'z exemplifies U and z exemplifies V '.
A theory of the structure of universals should provide characterizations of such operations as conjunction without using correspondence. To use the same symbols for operations on predicates and universals might suggest that we are assimilating universals to predicates. My restriction of the symbols '&', '∃', '∨' and '¬' to operations on predicates helps to avoid this suggestion. If, for instance, I wrote the (narrow) conjunction of U x and V y as U z & V z, the nominal definition would be:
where the left and right hand sides differ only in whether the symbol '&' is in italics.
Mereology without unique fusion
As a reminder that the mereology being considered holds for universals as well as particulars I use upper case letters for the variables. I take the primitive predicate to be the transitive reflexive dyadic predicate 'X is a part of Y ' ('X Y '). We may define identity (X = Y iff X Y and Y X), proper parts (X < Y iff X Y and not Y X), overlapping (X • Y iff for some Z, Z X and Z Y ) and being disjoint: X and Y are disjoint just in case they do not overlap) 8 .
Mutual fusion is obviously an equivalence relation. The equivalence classes will be called fusion classes.
An alternative development of mereology is based on the concept of mereological sum. Then we may define X Y as Y = X + Y . This is I think inferior for two reasons. First, the paradigms of things with parts are not mereological sums but rather structured things with essential relations between the parts. The idea of a mereological sum is an abstraction away from these relations. For artefacts this abstraction is easy. A piece of flat pack furniture might consist of, say, 97 parts to banged and screwed together. The resulting piece of furniture consists of 96 parts with various essential geometric relations plus the left-over screw. It is easy to abstract away from these relations and consider the sum of the 96 parts, which existed before assembly and would continue to exist given a gentle enough disassembly. Such abstraction is harder for the case of an animal composed of distinct organs. Thus Aristotle's unwillingness to think of the organs as parts is understandable if we take summation as primitive. He was a brilliant zoologist but it would have been unfair to ask him to take his sea urchin apart and put it back together again  alive. The lesson is to prefer ' ' as the primitive predicate, and take an animal's organs as paradigm parts.
Another reason for preferring ' ' as the mereological primitive, is that, in the interests of intellectual economy, we should try to give an account of structure in terms of mereology and hence avoid a structural theory of mereology. I admit that it is not that clear just what counts as structure, but X being the sum of Y and Z seems more like structure than U being part of V .
I conclude that the idea of summation as composition relies too much on the use of artefacts as paradigms, and I draw the corollary that we should not rely upon intuitions based on the summation-as-composition approach to mereology.
How then do we analyse summation? Elsewhere I have used examples to argue that our intuitive idea of a sum is of a least upper bound that is also a fusion (see [6] ). If readers disagree they may take that as a stipulative definition of summation. So I have the following definitions.
1. An upper bound of some things is something that has all of them as parts. A lower bound of some things is something that is part of them all. 2 . A least upper bound or join of some things is an upper bound of them that is part of any other upper bound of them. A greatest lower bound or meet of some things is an lower bound of them of which any other lower bound is part. 3 . A fusion of some things, the F s, is something that overlaps precisely those things that overlap some F . (Hence, as expected, X and Y are fusion equivalent iff X is a fusion of Y and vice versa.) 4. A sum of some things, the F s, is a join of the F s that is also a fusion.
A proper sum is a proper join that is also a fusion.
By anti-symmetry there cannot be more than one join of some things, and we may talk of the sum of X and Y , X + Y . I shall assume a general principle governing the mereology of universals, namely that any universals X and Y have a join and this join is the sum X + Y . I have no objection to assuming that even infinitely many universals have a sum, which is required for a theory of infinitely complex universals, but that is not my present concern.
Mereology in Leśniewski's sense (Classical Mereology) is obtained by assuming the existence and uniqueness of arbitrary fusions. This paper is compatible with the existence of arbitrary fusions although some readers might want to restrict fusion to things of the same kind. Uniqueness of fusion is, however, more problematic and I reject it along with Weak Supplementation. The case for their rejection is that putative counter-examples occur in several different areas of metaphysics. Here are some instances.
First, suppose we follow David Lewis and take the subsets of a set to be parts. If we then allow the empty set as a genuine subset of every set, all sets overlap. Assuming also that pure sets have no parts other than sets, it follows that every pure set is a fusion of every other pure set.
In particular ∅ and {∅} are mutual fusions, as well as providing a counterexample to Weak Supplementation. 'So much the worse for the empty set', you might retort; and if this was the only putative counter-example to unique fusion that retort would be appropriate.
My next case is that some of us find it intuitive that s and all its parts are among the parts of {s}. In that case, {{s}} and {s} are mutual fusions, and a counter-example to Weak Supplementation 9 . Finally, there is the lump of clay and the statue  of 'The Maid of All Work' presumably. Here is a simplified case. Suppose b and c are distinct particular atoms that are adjacent. Then we may consider both the analog of the clay, their sum (b + c), and the analog of the statue, badjacent-to-c. First suppose we are nominalists and deny the existence of a relation of x being adjacent to y, as well as derived properties such as x being adjacent to something. Then (b + c) and b-adjacent-to-c are mutual fusions and provide a counter-example to Uniqueness of Fusion. Judith Jarvis Thompson (1998: 155) takes the statue and the lump of clay as mutual parts, on the basis that if at some time the location of x is part of that of y then at that time x is itself part of y. Aaron Cotnoir ([4] ) would say that because they are mutual parts they provide a counter-example to Mereological Extensionality. 10 Both on grounds of conservativism and intuition even a nominalist should concede that (b + c) is a proper part of b-adjacent-to-c, and not vice versa. So this is a counter-example to Weak Supplementation rather than Mereological Extensionality.
If, as I advocate, however, we are realists about the relation x being adjacent to y, holding between b and c, then we could say that b-adjacent- 9 Ben Caplan, Chris Tillman, and Pat Reeder (see [3] ) share my intuition. They assume that ∅ < {s} < {{s}}, but not ∅ s, unless s is itself a set. 10 The supposed failure of antisymmetry for parthood without identity is also discussed by Cotnoir and Andrew Bacon in [5] and Lida Obojska in [11] . Chris Tillman and Gregory Fowler in [14] argue for this failure on the grounds that the sum of everything is a part of propositions about this sum of everything, which in turn is part of the sum of everything. In all three examples we could reject otherwise fairly promising metaphysical speculations by an appeal to the uniqueness of fusions. In the third case our conclusion would not merely be negative; we would have a positive argument for the 'trope' theory. In none of the three examples, however, is the uniqueness intuitive in the circumstances. In addition, I hold that the uniqueness of sums, and, I suspect, the uniqueness of fusions, is held largely as a result of identifying fusions with sums. I take these considerations to undermine the Uniqueness of Fusions.
Given This digression is relevant because it shows that concentrating, as I shall, on fusion classes is not some technical trick but a natural way of thinking of non-classical mereology as a refinement of classical mereology without going as far as Cotnoir. It is also explains why classical mereology fails to provide a theory of structural universals. For such a theory requires operations for 'forming' a universal out of another fusion equivalent one.
Operations on universals, with examples
My method is to consider the operations used to 'compose' structural universals. I shall then show how these operations may be analysed in purely mereological terms.
The first operation I consider is reflexive binding whereby two of the places of a universal are identified. For instance, if Rxy is a dyadic relation then often there is a monadic universal, Rxx. So if there is a relation Rxy of x being a mirror image of y, Rxx is the property x's being its own mirror image. The exceptions occur when Rxx either for no x or for all. If, for instance, we take x being a part of y to be a universal then it has no reflexive binding because everything is part of itself, and if we take x being a proper part of y to be a universal then it has no reflexive binding because nothing is a proper part of itself. In general, if n 0 and U x 1 x 2 . . . x n+1 is (n + 1)-adic, then there may be reflexive bindings to an n-adic universal obtained by replacing x i and x j by z, for any i = j.
Next there is existential binding. If U xy is an (n + 1)-adic universal, where n 1 then there universals such as ∃x U xy and ∃y U xy in which a free variable is bound by an existential quantifier. This operation applies, I submit, even to properties. For I hypothesize that for any property U x there is an existential state of affairs of the form ∃x U x, which obtains in a particular z just in case U x is instantiated in z.
Because they can obtain in many disjoint particulars these are 0-adic universals not particulars.
These two operations of reflexive and existential binding generate the counter-example to modal extensionality that I mentioned above. Consider a transitive symmetric relation Rxy that is not reflexive. In that case Ryy and ∃x Rxy are necessarily co-extensive. And such relations cannot be excluded by appeal to the sparse character of the realism about universals. For consider Sxy, a symmetric irreflexive relation, for example x being adjacent to y without overlapping. Then the ancestral Rxy of Sxy will be symmetric and transitive but perhaps not reflexive. In the example, Sxy is the property of y being adjacent to something (without overlap).
The conjunction of two monadic universals U x and V y is usually  I say narrowly  defined as U z & V z, using the convention that the symbol '&' connects predicates. This definition of narrow conjunction extends straightforwardly to two universals of the same adicity:
If U x 1 x 2 . . . x n and V y 1 y 2 . . . y n are both n-adic, then their narrow conjunctions are the n-adic universals obtained from the predicate Ux 1 x 2 . . . The broad conjunction of a universal with itself is, I now argue, the same universal. For simplicity consider a monadic universal U x. Then the broad conjunction is U x & U y. There is no requirement that x = y, so U x is instantiated in precisely the same particulars as U x & U y. That does not, I admit, prove that they are the same but it supports the identification. In addition, they make the same contribution to resemblance, causal powers and any other roles played by universals. Likewise, if Rxy is not itself a conjunction U x & V y, it corresponds to the 2k-ary predicates Ruv, Ruv & Rwx, Ruv & Rwx & Ryz, etc. In general a nonconjunctive n-adic universal corresponds to nk-ary predicates.
There will not, in general be a unique narrow conjunction of universals. For One important example is the irreflexive strengthening of a dyadic relation U xy, which, if it exists, is the subtraction of the symmetrisation of U xy from U xy itself. For example if U xy is x loving y, the irreflexive strengthening is x loving y but not vice versa. Another important example is the universal x having as parts exactly n disjoint U s, which is the result of subtracting x having as parts at least n disjoint U s from x having as parts at least n − 1 disjoint U s. The universal x having as parts at least n disjoint U s will be analysed below.
The broad and other disjunctions of universals, if they exist, are defined much as for conjunctions, by replacing '&' by 'and/or'. It should be noted, however, that three or more universals might have a disjunction without two of them having one. This is the typical situation with determinables of a determinate: there is no disjunction of x's being dove grey and x's being charcoal grey but there is a disjunction of all the (50?) shades of grey, namely the determinable x's being grey. A theory of sparse universals should tell us some of the circumstances in which universals have disjunctions. I submit that determinable properties may well be such cases of systematic disjunction. We have an intuition, which should be endorsed by those who are realist both about colours and about universals, that being red is a respect of resemblance, and hence that the predicate 'is red' corresponds to a determinable property rather than referring to several precise red hues. Likewise, enthusiasts for speculative physics (a.k.a. mathematical metaphysics) who are also realists about universals might well wonder whether the determinable universal x's being of hypervolume less than one Planck unit has any (actual) instances. It is natural, although not compulsory, to think of determinables whose determinates are first order properties as themselves first order properties, namely the disjunction of the, perhaps infinitely many, determinates. The alternative is to treat determinables as higher order properties. In that case 'red' applies to x just in case x is an instance of some universal X that is itself an instance of X's being a shade of red. Without settling this, I shall provide a theory that treats a determinable as the disjunction of its determinates.
The determinates of a determinable are pairwise inconsistent, which would cause me problems if there were polyadic determinables that were not totally symmetric. A putative example would be x being earlier than y, whose determinates would be of the form x being earlier than y by t seconds for any positive real number t. I submit, however, that we can analyse this as the conjunction of x being earlier than y with x being separated from y by t seconds. The determinable x being separated from y by some positive number of seconds is, then, symmetric. Quite generally given any antisymmetric determinable we may analyse it in terms of its qualitative structure and a symmetric quantitative determinable.
I shall conclude this section with a couple of examples, starting with x having as parts at least n disjoint U s. This is, I say, one relatum of the higher order dyadic relation, of cardinality at least n. The other relatum is U x itself. Clearly x having as parts at least n disjoint U s is to be characterised recursively. The recursion requires the dyadic relation x and y are disjoint. Then x having as parts at least n + 1 disjoint U s is the result of existential binding (of x and y) of repeated reflexive bindings (putting x = x 1 = x 2 = x 3 , and y = y 1 = y 2 = y 3 ) of the broad conjunction of:
(1) x 1 is part of z, (2) y 1 as part of z, (3) x 2 having as parts at least n disjoint Us, (4) y 2 having a U as a part and (5) the relation of x 3 being disjoint from y 3 .
Of these (4) y 2 having a U as a part, is itself obtained by existential binding (of w) of the repeated reflexive binding (putting w = w 1 = w 2 ) of the broad conjunction of w 1 is part of y 2 and U w 2 . The case n = 1, which starts the recursion does not require (3).
Finally, in honour of Lewis' objection, u is a methane molecule is the narrow conjunction of:
(1) u has one part that is a carbon atom, (2) u has four parts that are hydrogen atoms and (3) the existential binding (of v, w, x, y, and z) 
The mereology of structural universals
In this section I explore the mereology of structural universals, a topic that is both of intrinsic interest (to me anyway) and a preliminary to the mereological characterisation of the operations considered above.
Broad conjunction
I identify the broad conjunction of two universals with their join, which I am assuming is also their sum, noting that the rival hypothesis (the identification of narrow conjunction with the sum) violates the theoretically elegant principle that any two things (of the same kind) have a sum. For inconsistent universals have no narrow conjunction. Moreover the rival requires the distinction between a dyadic relation and its converse. Consider for instance the narrow conjunctions of the anti-symmetric relations: Ewx = w being earlier than x and Syz = y being shorter (i.e. of less duration) than z.
Then Exy & Sxy = Exy & Syz, but if narrow conjunctions were sums both would have equal claim to be the sum.
Existential binding
Relying on the Parthood Instantiation Principle, I take a universal to be part of any of its reflexive bindings. Existential bindings are not so straightforward. For U xy . . . and its existential binding ∃x U xy . . . are instantiated in precisely the same particulars. Consider the case of the monadic V x and its 0-adic existential binding ∃x V x. They differ in their negations, if they have them. For example, take V x to be x's being infinite. Its negation is x's being finite but the negation of ∃x V x is the state of affairs of there being nothing infinite, that is of everything being finite, which is instantiated in a region w just in case w has no infinite parts and so w is itself finite. The property x's being finite is, however, instantiated in w just in case w has some finite part. Relying on the Parthood Instantiation Principle, x's being finite is plausibly taken, therefore, as a proper part of everything being finite. Given the way negation was characterised ∃x V x should therefore be a proper part of V x. Any determinable is, I hypothesise, fusion equivalent to its determinates. Here I include determinable structural universals because substituting a fusion equivalent property in a complex universal preserves fusion equivalence. Thus x's having red and black parts is fusion equivalent to x's having scarlet and black parts.
The fusion equivalence class of a system of determinates of a determinable property includes its existential bindings, that is the state of affairs that some determinate is instantiated. This suggests a further hypothesis about the fusion class of a universal: 
The mereology of determinables and determinates
If we are given the mereological structure of a fusion class we could easily recognise non-trivial systems of determinates of a determinate, as follows. (By a trivial system I mean one with only the one member.)
For simplicity I shall concentrate on the discrete case, namely that in which if U xy . . 
The product structure of a fusion class
We may consider the universals in a given fusion class F that are all cores of systems of determinables. This is a partially ordered system C ordered by parthood. We may also consider all the 0-adic members of the fusion class, which forms another partially ordered system D, again ordered by parthood. Consider the functions c and d from F onto C and D respectively, such that c maps each universal to its core and d maps each universal to its total existential binding. We may think of the determinable structure exemplified by D stretching out horizontally in a diagram and the structure of existential and reflexive binding exemplified by C rising vertically above each member of D. For some fusion classes this will be trivial because there is no genuine system of determinates of a determinable, everything universal being of level 1. But in non-trivial cases the product structure is a perspicuous analysis.
Using mereology to characterise the operations
By relaxing the requirement of unique fusion the system of all universals has enough mereological structure for us to characterise the various operations. First note that the product structure enables systems of determinates of determinables to be picked out, so, we may if we choose concentrate on the absolute determinates (determinables of level 1).
The adicity of universals
The 0-adic universals are characterised as those universals incompatible with any other universal. Any universal with a maximal proper part that is 0-adic and which is not itself 0-adic is a property. (The maximal proper part is an existential binding).
Existential binding
If a universal U xy . . . is maximal among (n − 1)-adic parts of a n-adic universal V xy . . 
Objections and replies
I have characterised various operations on universals using non-classical mereology. I now reply to various objections.
Correspondence
The operations on universals were defined using correspondence and subsequently characterised mereologically. It remains to characterise correspondence, without relying on Modal Extensionality. For some predicates, we may refer to in some way (perhaps by means of figurative language) some paradigms. In such cases the predicate corresponds to the salient universal instantiated by those particulars, if there is a unique salient universal. To say it is salient among those that are instantiated by the paradigms is to say that is the one we humans think of most easily. It is a contingent fact about human beings that we have rather limited ability to think of universals. Otherwise there might not be enough salient ones. But given this limited ability I hold there are enough correspondences to provide paradigms of the operations on universals. Given our limited powers to think of second-order universals we then can consider the second order universals corresponding to the operations on first order universals. It follows that we do not need a complete correspondence between predicates and (some) universals in order to characterise the operations on universals. It also follows that we may use these operations to extend the domain of predicates for which there is correspondence to include ones corresponding to structural universals 'formed out of' 'more basic' universals to which predicates already correspond.
The application of asymmetric predicates
If a relation lacks total symmetry then there is more than one predicate corresponding to it. So, for example, the universal x's loving y (Lxy) corresponds to both the predicates 'x loves y' and 'y loves x'. The objection is that, on my proposed theory, there is nothing that makes it true that Mary loves John rather than John loves Mary.
My reply is that there will be some distinguishing monadic properties, Suppose the only distinguishing features of Mary and John is that Mary loves John but not vice versa  maybe they are angels of the same species. Then my previous reply fails. But in this case we do not need anything to make it true that Mary loves John, not vice versa. Mary is characterised precisely as the one of the pair that loves the other.
Maybe you posit thisnesses, so that in spite of a lack of monadic universals to distinguish Mary from John they have different thisnesses. Then, I submit, thisnesses are to be considered honorary universals and incorporated into the mereological theory as such.
The perverse convoluted ontology
The complicated mereological characterisation of the 'structure' of universals could be objected to both by a misguided appeal to simplicity and in a less obvious way, to which I must reply in detail. The misguided objection is that the complications of my proposed theory rule it out as a fundamental ontology. It is not, I reply, the proposed ontology that is shown to be complicated but the correspondence with our predicates.
The less obvious objection relies upon the way that scientific realism presupposes that scientists 'carve nature at the joints'. Hence, the predicates of established science must correspond straightforwardly to universals. For example methane and other hydrocarbons may be classified in terms of the structure of carbon, hydrogen and bonding. Again, the various atomic nuclei are classified in terms of the numbers of protons and neutrons in them. If we replace this classification by the proposed mereological analyses, we get gobbledegook.
I concede that the way we think of things does correspond rather closely to the structure of universals. I further concede that the mereological theory of structural universals does not reveal this correspondence, which may, however, be described in terms of second-order univer-sals. Thus the second-order relation of X being the narrow conjunction of Y and Z holds between three universals U xy . . ., V xy . . . and W xy . . . just in case . . . , where the dots are filled in by the proposed mereological analysis of narrow conjunction; and likewise for all the other operations. These second-order universals reveal the structure of complex universals, as proposed by John Bigelow in [2] . The mereological analysis of the operations has the advantage over Bigelow's of not multiplying primitive second-order universals. Nonetheless these second-order relations are real, and underpin the anti-Kantian correspondence between the way we think and the way things are in themselves, which is presupposed, I say, by scientific realism.
Conclusion
If we reject classical mereology then it is possible to develop a mereological theory of first-order universals, illustrating the power of non-classical mereology. This is just one step towards a mereological theory of the whole of analytic ontology.
